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PROTECTING AMERICA'S ELECTIONS FROM FOREIGN
TAMPERING: REALIZING THE BENEFITS OF
CLASSIFYING ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE AS
"CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE" UNDER THE UNITED
STATES CODE
In just the past five years, the United States has suffered nu-
merous hacks into important entities and institutions across the
country by ill-intentioned actors. Private companies and govern-
ment agencies alike have felt the negative impacts of security
breaches by hackers infiltrating proprietary and protected sys-
tems.' Even the United States political landscape has proven vul-
nerable to bad actors in the realm of cyber security.2 Further-
more, analysts have attributed some of the most recent highly
publicized hacks to state-sponsored groups.3 As cyber security
threats and opportunities for foreign hackers to infiltrate critical
systems become more prevalent, it is natural to wonder where the
next hack will occur, when it will happen, and whom it will af-
fect.
4
Many experts believe the next frontier for state-sponsored
hackers could be election processes.' While some have maintained
1. See generally Michael Cieply & Brooks Barnes, Sony Cyberattack, First a Nui-
sance, Swiftly Grew Into a Firestorm, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.
com2014/12/3 lfbusiness/media/sony-attack-first-a-nuisance-swiftly-grew-into-a-fire storm-
.html? r=0; Julie Hirscheld Davis, Hacking of Government Computers Exposed 21.5 Mil-
lion People, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.con2015/07/10/us/office-of-
personnel-management-hackers-got-data-of-millions.html?_r=0.
2. See Wesley Bruer & Evan Perez, Officials: Hackers Breach Election Systems in
Illinois, Arizona, CNN (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/29/politics/hackers-
breach-iUinois-arizona-election-systems/; Tal Kopan, DNC Hack: What You Need To Know,
CNN (June 21, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/21/politics/dnc-hack-russians-guccifer-
claims/.
3. See, e.g., Cieply & Barnes, supra note 1 (attributing the Sony hack to North Ko-
rea); Kopan, supra note 2 (attributing the Democratic National Committee ("DNC") hack
to Russia).
4. See, e.g., Amanda Taub, D.N. C. Hack Raises a Frightening Question: What's Next?,
N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/30/world/europe/dnc-hack-
russia.html.
5. NSA Chief Says Spy Agencies Are Concerned Over Possible U.S. Election Hacks,
FORTUNE.COM (Sept. 13, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/13/nsa-chief-election-hack/; see
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that a large-scale hack on election systems would be difficult be-
cause many voting machines are not directly connected to the in-
ternet,6 others have noted that "the machines ... Americans use
at the polls are less secure than the iPhones they use to navigate
their way there."7 Additionally, the mere potential for disrupting
election infrastructure threatens the general public's faith in the
democratic process.8 Wavering faith in the democratic election
process can call into question the legitimacy of American govern-
ment, harm the United States' reputation abroad, and threaten
the peaceful transition of power after Election Day.
Scholars point out that there is "no singular national body that
regulates the security or even execution of what happens on Elec-
tion Day."9 Article I of the United States Constitution gives indi-
vidual states the power to control the "Times, Places and Man-
ner" of congressional elections. ° Article II and the Twelfth
Amendment set forth a bare bones procedure by which members
of the Electoral College are appointed within individual states for
presidential elections." Overall, both election processes and pres-
idential election processes are administered primarily by the
states and are largely state controlled. 2 With the exception of
some measured federal intervention, when issues of voting rights
and election integrity are implicated, 3 Congress has taken a di-
minished role in regulating elections in the United States. 4 As a
result, state-controlled election processes and infrastructures
have created a disjointed electoral system across America that is
ill-prepared to respond to a hack or state-sponsored attempt to in-
fluence the outcome of an American election.
Members of the Aspen Institute Homeland Security Group Issue Statement on DNC Hack,
PRNEwSWIRE.COM (July 28, 2016), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/members-
of-the-aspen-institute-homeland-security-group-issue-statement-on-dnc-hack-
300306004.html.
6. Massimo Calabresi, Hacking the Voter, TIME, Oct. 10, 2016, at 30.
7. Ben Wofford, How to Hack an Election in 7 Minutes, POLITICO (Aug. 5, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/08/2016-elections-russia-hack-how-to-hack-
an-election-in-seven-minutes-214144.
8. Calabresi, supra note 6.
9. Wofford, supra note 7.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
11. U.S. CONST. art II., § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
12. See Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U.L. REV.
553, 553 (2015).
13. See Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV. 747, 755
(2016).
14. Douglas, supra note 12.
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The disjointed nature of states' election processes-together
with the primitive nature of voting machine data security tech-
nology and the rising ubiquity of cyber security hacks-suggests
that the United States' voting apparatus may be vulnerable to
foreign tampering. In August 2016, Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity Jeh Johnson proposed a potential solution to this vulnerabil-
ity." He suggested that the federal government should seriously
consider classifying voting processes as "critical infrastructure"
under the United States Code. 6 On January 6, 2017, Johnson
formally implemented this policy change by announcing the des-
ignation of election infrastructure as critical infrastructure with-
in the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). 17
DHS regulates and oversees the country's critical infrastruc-
ture to ensure that it is protected. 8 The nation depends on the
safety of critical infrastructure industries to ensure physical and
economic security. DHS has classified sixteen industries as criti-
cal infrastructure sectors, including the transportation systems
sector, the chemical sector, the emergency management sector,
the government facilities sector, and others. 9 These sectors are
comprised of private infrastructure owners who utilize DHS's re-
sources and information sharing network to thwart potential at-
tacks on their security." The classification of election infrastruc-
ture as critical infrastructure opens up an avenue for DHS to step
in and regulate election processes. Such regulation will result in
15. See Christian Science Monitor Breakfast with Jeh Johnson, C-SPAN (Aug. 3, 2016),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?413496- lhomeland-security-secretary-jeh-johnson-speaks-
christian-science-monitor-breakfast ("I do think that we should carefully consider whether
our election system . . .is critical infrastructure like the financial sector [and] like the
power grid.").
16. Id. Critical infrastructure is defined in the U.S. Code as "systems and assets,
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction
of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national econom-
ic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters." 42
U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2012).
17. Press Release, U.S. Dep't Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson on
the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector (Jan. 6,
2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/06/statement-secretary-johnson-designation-elec
tion-infrastructure-critical [hereinafter Press Release, Secretary Jeh Johnson].
18. Critical Infrastructure Sectors, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/
crtical-infrastructure-sectors (last visited Apr. 5, 2017); Office of Infrastructure Protection,
DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/office-infrastructure-protection (last visit-
ed Apr. 5, 2017).
19. Critical Infrastructure Sectors, supra note 18.
20. See Critical Infrastructure Sector Partnerships, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC, https:
//www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sector-partnerships# (last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
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much needed information sharing across states with regard to
their voting systems and procedures, increase federal resources
for state election administration, and restore the general public's
faith in the democratic process of American elections.21
Advocating for increased federal supervision over elections is
not a new concept, 22 but the manner and scope of proposed federal
oversight has been an issue of considerable debate.22 DHS's re-
cent classification of voting systems as "critical infrastructure"
has prompted even more disagreement as to whether this is the
correct classification and what federal regulation in this space
should attempt to accomplish.24 This comment argues that DHS is
right to classify election infrastructure as "critical infrastructure"
and takes the position that federal supervision over elections
should accordingly increase. Part I discusses state control of elec-
tion administration, the creation and development of DHS, and
the critical infrastructure framework in general. Part II argues
that DHS is correct in its classification and asserts that voting
processes are properly understood as critical infrastructure. It
highlights states' current problems in ensuring the security of
elections. Finally, it posits that a critical infrastructure designa-
tion for election processes allows DHS to promulgate regulations
in the election space to help secure the integrity of elections. Part
III explains the benefits that DHS regulations have had on other
critical infrastructure industries. It suggests that similar regula-
tions in the election sphere could benefit election processes now
that they too are classified as critical infrastructure. This com-
ment concludes that the critical infrastructure classification for
election infrastructure will help thwart potential state-sponsored
threats to American election legitimacy.
21. The potential federalism concerns regarding federal executive branch supervision
over state-administered elections is beyond the scope of this comment.
22. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen & Edward J. Larson, Congressional Power Over Presiden-
tial Elections: Lessons from the Past and Reforms for the Future, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
851, 853 (2002) (stating that "[p]residential election controversies are nothing new").
23. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Judging "New Law" in Election Disputes, 29 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 691, 694-95 (2001) (advocating for a more "aggressively 'centralizing"' approach
to federal oversight in state election law).
24. Press Release, Jeh Johnson, supra note 17 ("I have determined that election infra-
structure in this country should be designated as a subsector of the existing Government
Facilities critical infrastructure sector. Given the vital role elections play in this country,
it is clear that certain systems and assets of election infrastructure meet the definition of
critical infrastructure, in fact and in law.").
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I. TRADITIONAL STATE CONTROL OVER ELECTION
ADMINISTRATION AND FEDERAL SUPERVISION OVER CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE INDUSTRIES
A. States Largely Control Election Administration
The states, rather than the federal government, are the prima-
ry administrators of elections across the country. Towns, coun-
ties, and cities oversee and administrate federal elections.25 Each
state's Secretary of State usually serves as its chief election of-
ficer who leads the voting administration apparatus within the
state.2" Below the Secretary of State are state election officials,
who are responsible for preparing ballots, organizing polling plac-
es, training poll officials, and counting votes." They also help reg-
ister voters and maintain voters' personally identifiable infor-
mation." Finally, these state election officials manage the
maintenance and use of voting machinery and equipment. 29 They
monitor voting machinery and help voters utilize it on Election
Day." After Election Day, states retain auditing power over the
election results.2" However, auditing procedures vary from state
to state.2
Many sources of legal authority underpin state primacy over
election administration. The United States Constitution gives the
states the power to prescribe the "[t]imes, [p]laces and [m]anner
of holding [congressional] [e]lections"" and "appoint, in such
[m]anner as the [legislature thereof may direct, a [n]umber of
[e]lectors" for presidential elections. 3'4 Additionally, Congress en-
acted only a limited number of federal statutes in the area," and
"federal courts are increasingly likely to defer to a state's interest
25. See Robert S. Montjoy, The Public Administration of Elections, 68 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 788, 788 (2008).
26. Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Democracy and the Secretary: The Crucial Role of State
Election Administrators in Promoting Accuracy and Access to Democracy, 27 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 343, 359-60 (2008); see also Montjoy, supra note 25, at 788-89.
27. Montjoy, supra note 25, at 789.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 790.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 790, 794.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
34. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 2.
35. See Douglas, supra note 12, at 553.
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in a particular policy [regarding election administration] unless it
is blatantly unconstitutional or discriminatory."36
B. Hacking Elections Presents a Unique National Security
Concern That States are Unable to Address Alone
Even though states largely control almost all election admin-
istration-related endeavors, they are unable to adequately ad-
dress the current threat of foreign actors hacking into United
States elections. Hackers present a unique threat to elections be-
cause states do not maintain the resources or means to prevent,
identify, or quash potential hacks from foreign actors. The frag-
mented nature of the United States' election process, the charac-
teristic that grants individual states autonomy over elections ad-
ministered within the state, contributes to the issues states have
in responding to threats from hackers. State control over elections
has created a system of unique local practices for election admin-
istration. Such "[d]ecentralization and fragmentation affect the
uniformity of administration and the capacity of systems to im-
plement top-down mandates."37 When administration issues arise,
such as hackers infiltrating voter registration databases, 38 states
struggle with troubleshooting measures because each locality's
voting processes and procedures are different.
State election officials are responsible for preparing ballots, or-
ganizing polling places, training poll officials, and counting
votes.39 These tasks already present formidable challenges for
state election officials, and the added threat of hackers infiltrat-
ing voting infrastructure is not something states currently have
the resources to address. Quality of training for polling officials
varies widely from state to state,40 but none are trained on how to
identify, respond to, or neutralize a threat in the form of a foreign
hack into an election administration system. Scholars suggest
that the quality of training for these state officials matters.41
When election officials are better trained and understand the
36. Benson, supra note 26, at 344.
37. Montjoy, supra note 25, at 789.
38. See Bruer & Perez, supra note 2.
39. Montjoy, supra note 25, at 789.
40. J. MIJIN CHA & Liz KENNEDY, MILLIONS TO THE POLLS: PRACTICAL POLICIES TO
FULFILL THE FREEDOM TO VOTE FOR ALL AMERICANS 2 (2014).
41. Montjoy, supra note 25, at 791.
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procedures put in place to rectify particular voting administration
problems, elections run much more smoothly. However, not all
state election officials have access to adequate training opportu-
nities before Election Day.42
Additionally, the voting machine technology used by many
states is acutely vulnerable to threats by hackers. Federal law
mandates the availability of computerized state voter registration
systems and promotes the use of electronic voting machinery.43
One might believe that this federal mandate and stamp of ap-
proval would increase uniformity throughout states' election pro-
cedures, reliability in election results, and safety from tampering.
However, "those systems, especially the kinds that record votes
directly into a computer's memory (DREs), raise concerns about
security and reliability."' Due to the lack of security and reliabil-
ity of DREs, hackers are able to infiltrate the machinery and alter
vote inputs." At least thirty-two states used DREs at polling
places during the presidential election on November 8, 2016.6
Despite the widespread use of these machines, experts continu-
ously note security concerns and general usage problems with us-
ing DREs during elections. 7
C. History of Federal Supervision Over Critical Infrastructure
While states largely control election administration, the federal
government is the main supervisory body over the United States'
critical infrastructure. The United States Code defines "critical
infrastructure" as "systems and assets, whether physical or vir-
tual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruc-
tion of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact
on security, national economic security, national public health or
safety, or any combination of those matters." Many of the indi-
vidual entities that directly deal with critical infrastructure are
42. Weinstein-Tull, supra note 13, at 779.
43. Help America Vote Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901-21145 (2012 & Supp. II. 2015).
44. ARTHUR L. BURRIS & ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20898, THE
HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT AND ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: OVERVIEW AND SELECTED
ISSUES FOR THE 2016 ELECTION X (2016).
45. See id. at 13-14.
46. The Verifier-Polling Place Equipment-2016, VERIFIED VOTING, https://www.
verifiedvoting.org/verifier/# (last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
47. See, e.g., BURRIS & FISCHER, supra note 44.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2012).
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private companies.49 The federal government created DHS with
the particular aim of consolidating its supervisory role over the
nation's critical infrastructure. 0 DHS streamlined the federal
government's capability to thwart and respond to potential at-
tacks on critical infrastructure industries. However, from its in-
ception, DHS was required to cooperate with private sector criti-
cal infrastructure companies to achieve its goals."' The critical
infrastructure framework is specifically structured to ensure the
autonomy of critical infrastructure controllers while simultane-
ously encouraging communication and information sharing
amongst controllers within each critical infrastructure sector.
Prior to the creation of DHS, critical infrastructure considera-
tions and "homeland security activities were spread across more
than 40 federal agencies and an estimated 2,000 separate Con-
gressional appropriations accounts."52 Congress' efforts to protect
critical infrastructure by legislation began more than a hundred
years ago.53 However, the more modern move by the executive
branch to create a streamlined system of control over the nation's
critical infrastructure began with the Clinton administration.
In July 1996, President Bill Clinton established the President's
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection ("PCCIP") via
an executive order, which recognized the need for "a comprehen-
sive national policy and implementation strategy for protecting
critical infrastructures from physical and cyber threats and as-
suring their continued operation."'4 President Clinton's initial ex-
ecutive order set forth the following critical infrastructure sec-
tors: telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil
storage and transportation, banking and finance, transportation,
49. Critical Infrastructure Sector Partnerships, supra note 20.
50. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, PROPOSAL TO CREATE THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY 3 (2002), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/book
_0.pdf ('The Department would be responsible for comprehensively evaluating the vulner-
abilities of America's critical infrastructure . .
51. Id.
52. ELIZABETH C. BORTA, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., HISTORY OFFICE, BRIEF
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: 2001-2008 3
(2008).
53. Critical Infrastructure Protection Oral History Project and Digital Archive,
GEORGE MASON UNiV., http://chnm.gmu.educipdigitalarchive/timeline.php?century=19&
decade=2&year=1916 (last visited Apr. 5, 2017) (noting that in 1916, prior to the United
States joining the allies in World War I, Congress created the Council of National Defense
as part of the Army Appropriations Act).
54. Exec. Order No. 13,010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,347, 37,348 (July 17, 1996).
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water supply systems, emergency services, and continuity of gov-
ernment.55
The PCCIP produced a report in October of 1997, which advo-
cated for sharing information among infrastructure owners, es-
tablishing awareness of critical infrastructure vulnerabilities,
and creating education programs to better help infrastructure
56
owners secure critical infrastructures from potential threats. Af-
ter the PCCIP's recommendations underwent interagency review,
President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive No. 63
("PDD-63") in 1998.17 PDD-63 set forth a national goal to protect
the United States' critical infrastructure from threats that would
diminish the abilities of the federal government, state and local
governments, and the private sector. 8 Additionally, PDD-63 iden-
tified particular sectors whose critical infrastructures should be
protected and assigned a "Lead Agency" to each sector. 9 These
Lead Agencies were in charge of running the critical infrastruc-
ture protection plan with regard to their individual critical infra-
structure industries. 6 At that point in 1998, the federal govern-
ment's plan to protect its critical infrastructure spanned multiple
different agencies, legal frameworks, and stakeholders.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Bush Ad-
ministration moved to consolidate the critical infrastructure or-
ganizational schema by creating a cabinet department primarily
dedicated to securing the nation's critical infrastructure from for-
eign threats. The federal government realized the dangers of de-
centralized supervision over critical infrastructure and quickly
consolidated its effort to protect it. Congress passed the Home-
land Security Act of 2002 ("the HSA"), which created DHS.6' The
HSA set forth DHS's mission, which included preventing terrorist
attacks, reducing the United States' vulnerability to terrorism,
and minimizing the damage of terrorist attacks if and when they
55. Id. at 37,347.
56. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, CRITICAL
FOUNDATIONS: PROTECTING AMERICA'S INFRASTRUCTURES xi (1997).
57. THE WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-63, CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (1998), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd=63.pdf.
58. Id. at 2-3.
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id.
61. See generally Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 111 (2012 & Supp. 2016)).
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are carried out in the country.62 By March 1, 2003, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, the Transportation Security
Administration, the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, the Unit-
ed States Secret Service, and various other agencies were brought
within DHS's control.
6 3
On December 17, 2003, the Bush Administration issued Home-
land Security Presidential Directive 7 ("HSPD-7").6 4 HSPD-7 es-
tablished a "national policy for Federal departments and agencies
to identify and prioritize United States critical infrastructure and
key resources and to protect them from terrorist attacks."65 It also
assessed the new critical infrastructure landscape after the HSA.
HSPD-7 clarified the Secretary of Homeland Security's role in co-
ordinating the unified national goal to ensure the security of crit-
ical infrastructure and the relationship between DHS and other
agencies that maintained direct regulatory powers over critical
infrastructure sectors.66 Additionally, it required Lead Agencies
"to report annually to the Secretary of Homeland Security on
their efforts in working with the private sector."67
Organizationally, the Homeland Security Council remains an
interagency group for coordinating policy across departments and
for informing the White House.68 Other agencies that previously
operated autonomously were brought within DHS's control and
were instructed to utilize their resources to protect critical infra-
structure industry sectors. Private entities within critical infra-
structure industry sectors were asked "to organize themselves to
assist in coordination of effort and information sharing."69 Certain
operational units outside of DHS's critical infrastructure frame-
work (for example, the FBI's National Infrastructure Protection
62. Id. § 101(b)(1), 116 Stat. 2142.
63. THE PRESIDENCY A-Z 283 (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 5th ed. 2013).
64. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification,
Prioritization, and Protection, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/homeland-
security-presidential-directive-7 (last visited Apr. 5, 2017) [hereinafter Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7]; see also JOHN D. MOTEFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30153,
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES: BACKGROUND, POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION 10 (2015).
65. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, supra note 64.
66. MOTEFF, supra note 64, at 10-11.
67. Id. at 11.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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Center) were initially left in place, though later moved to and re-
structured within DHS.
7 °
II. VOTING PROCESSES AS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
State primacy over election administration has resulted in a
number of widely publicized election administration issues. 1 The-
se election administration issues have prompted a national con-
versation about the legitimacy of elections in America and have
highlighted weaknesses in states' abilities to administer elec-
tions.72 It follows that state election procedures may be vulnerable
in other ways. The 2016 presidential campaigns emphasized the
potential vulnerability of American elections to foreign tampering
through hacking.73 As the system currently stands, states have no
clearly identified avenue for communicating with one another
about potential threats to election processes on Election Day.
This part argues first in Part II.A that DHS currently has the
power to regulate critical infrastructure industries in response to
national security concerns. It also notes that the Obama admin-
istration was acutely focused on thwarting attacks on United
States critical infrastructure via cyber mechanisms. Part II.B
then argues that voting processes fit well within this plain text
definition of critical infrastructure and the intent of the classifi-
cation. Now that election processes are classified as critical infra-
structure, the federal government can promulgate regulations
through DHS to protect the integrity of elections from foreign
hacker threats. This section also details federal legislation in oth-
er circumstances where states had problems administering elec-
tions. Finally, Part II.B concludes by stating that a critical infra-
70. Id. at 12.
71. See, e.g., Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 453, 456 (2015) (denying Maryland's
motion to dismiss a case brought by voters alleging that the state used gerrymandering
tactics with an intent to dilute and burden voters' political expression); Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98, 100 (2000) (per curiam) (describing an election tabulation discrepancy in Florida
during the 2000 presidential election that prompted a hand recount of 9000 "undervotes"
in Miami-Dade County); see also Structuring Judicial Review of Election Administration:
Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 314-17 (2007) (describing the
increase in litigation concerning voter participation and electoral mechanics issues).
72. See Andrew Gumbel, The History Of 'Rigged' US Elections: From Bush v Gore To
Trump v Clinton, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2016, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
/us-news/ 2016/oct/25/donald-trump-rigged-election-bush-gore-florida-voter-fraud.
73. Cory Bennett, U.S. Elections are More Vulnerable Than Ever to Hacking, POLITICO
(Dec. 29, 2016, 5:07 AM), www.politico.com/story/2016/12/election-hacking-vulnera bilities-
233024.
124920171
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
structure classification for voting processes allows the executive
branch to effectively regulate elections in ways that federal con-
gressional legislation has failed to do in the past.
A. DHS Can Regulate Critical Infrastructure in Response to
National Security Risks
Congress has given DHS broad power to exercise discretion
when regulating critical infrastructure sectors in response to na-
tional security concerns. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 di-
rectly addressed DHS's ability to issue regulations in the critical
infrastructure arena.74 DHS's regulatory capabilities flow from
the Administrative Procedure Act.7" The Homeland Security Act
of 2002 also took precautionary measures to ensure that it did not
vest any novel regulatory authority in the newly created DHS.
For instance, the Act only gave DHS the regulatory power al-
ready vested in other federal agencies on the day it was passed. 6
Additionally, DHS assumed the ability to regulate on behalf of all
of the agencies consolidated under its umbrella.
Though Congress vested DHS with broad power to regulate
critical infrastructure, the agency still must abide by other laws
that limit the scope of its regulatory capabilities. For example,
DHS abides by the mandates of the Regulatory Flexibility Act
and various executive orders that issue guidance for federal agen-
cy regulations.7 The Regulatory Flexibility Act commands federal
agencies to thoroughly consider the impact of potential rules and
regulations on entities of varying sizes before implementing such
rules and regulations.78 Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct
federal agencies to follow particular principles and practices
when issuing rules and regulations. 9 These principles require
agencies to carefully consider possible alternatives before propos-
ing a regulation. An agency must thoroughly analyze the costs
74. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-206, § 102(e), 116 Stat. 2135 (cod-
ified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 111 (2012 & Supp. 2016)).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 877, 116 Stat. at 2244-45.
77. DHS Rulemaking, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/dhs-rulemaking
(last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
78. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12 (2012)).
79. Exec. Order 13,563, 3 C.F.R 215 (2012); Exec. Order 12,866, 3. C.F.R. 638-39
(1994).
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and benefits of a proposed regulatory action, publish regulatory
flexibility agendas in the Federal Register, and work with the Of-
fice of Information and Regulatory Affairs when proposing regu-
lations under the federal rulemaking process.'
The Obama administration carried forward many of the Bush
administration's policies with respect to critical infrastructure
protection."' However, the Obama administration took a larger in-
terest in protecting critical infrastructure from cyber threats. 2
The security community, the Obama administration, and Con-
gress have debated the need to legislate and increase regulation
of cyber security as critical infrastructure. 3 However, passing leg-
islation in Congress has proven difficult. Interest groups are con-
cerned about the costs of additional regulations and the potential
for over-burdensome reporting requirements associated with reg-
ulations. 4 As a general statement of policy, owners and operators
of critical infrastructure work with the federal government on a
voluntary basis.8"
Today, the Undersecretary for National Protection and Pro-
grams, a DHS official, is responsible for implementing critical in-
frastructure regulatory policies and coordinating programs with
infrastructure owners." The National Protection and Programs
Directorate's mission is to make the nation's critical infrastruc-
ture as secure and resilient as possible, and to work against phys-
ical and cyber risk. 7 The Directorate strives to develop partner-
80. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 602 (2012) (requiring agencies to file biannual regulatory im-
pact assessments regarding the effects on small businesses); Exec. Order 13,563, 3 C.F.R.
215, 217 (2012) (requiring agencies to consider alternatives, perform cost-benefit analysis,
and consult with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs).
81. MOTEFF, supra note 64, at 12.
82. Dustin Volz & Mark Hosenball, Concerned by Cyber Threat, Obama Seeks Big In-
crease in Funding, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2016, 6:45 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
obama-budget-cyber-idUSKCNOVIOR1.
83. See MOTEFF, supra note 64, at 12-14.
84. See EDWARD C. LIU ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42409, CYBERSECURITY:
SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 2 (2013).
85. See MOTEFF supra note 64, at 11. For example, sharing information with the fed-
eral government about risk assessments, vulnerability calculations, and taking additional
protective actions is meant to be entirely voluntary.
86. See Suzanne E. Spaulding, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/person/
under-secretary-nppd-suzanne-e-spaulding (last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
87. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 21-CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE, (Feb. 12, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure
-security-and-resil; see also DEP'T HOMELAND SEC., NPPD AT A GLANCE (2014), https:
//www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nppd-at-a-glance-071614.pdf.
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ships with critical infrastructure owners and operators as well as
federal, state, and local officials. DHS takes a much more active
role in identifying critical assets, assessing vulnerabilities, and
recommending and supporting protective measures than did ear-
lier organizational structures.88 Also, the "manpower and re-
sources devoted to these activities have greatly increased" since
DHS's inception.89
In many cases, DHS effectuates its core mission to thwart acts
of terrorism through the promulgation of regulations that affect
critical infrastructure. There are six operational components un-
der DHS's wing with regulatory responsibilities: the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services, the United States
Coast Guard, the United States Customs and Border Protection,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Transportation
Security Administration.9" Additionally, DHS regulates through
the National Protection and Programs Directorate.91
B. Federal Regulation via DHS in the Election Arena is a Viable
Option to Respond to National Security Concerns over Election
Hacks
Voting processes fit within the plain text definition of critical
infrastructure and the federal government's intent in creating the
critical infrastructure framework. The definition of critical infra-
structure suggests that election processes fall within its proposed
scope.92 Disruption of election systems by ill-intentioned actors,
whether actual (through a carried out hack) or theoretical
(through threats that undermine faith in election legitimacy),93
88. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 21-CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE, (Feb. 12, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press.office/2013/02/12/presidential-pohcy-directive-critical-infrastructure
-security-and-resil.
89. MOTEFF, supra note 64, at 12.
90. DHS Rulemaking, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/dhs-rulemaking
(last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
91. Id.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2012).
93. See, e.g., Greg Miller & Adam Entous, Declassified Report Says Putin 'Ordered'
Effort to Undermine Faith in U.S. Election and Help Trump, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inteligence-chiefs-expected-in-
new-york-to-brief-trump-on-russian-hacking/2017/01/06/5f591416-d4la.1le6-9cbO-54ab6
30851e8_story.html?utm term=.534f~fblddbb.
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has a debilitating impact on national security. Additionally, the
federal government intended the critical infrastructure classifica-
tion to protect systems and infrastructures that are vital to the
national security of the United States.94 Ensuring the integrity of
voting processes is imperative to further continuity of govern-
ment and public faith in elections.95 In this way, election infra-
structure is uniquely suited to fit within the intended nature of
the critical infrastructure framework.
Even though the United States Constitution gives states a
large amount of control over election administration, Congress
has enacted substantial federal statutes in this area, which
proves the federal government is not averse to asserting some
level of supervision over election administration. The federal gov-
ernment has enacted a number of statutes largely to protect indi-
viduals' right to vote and ensure the integrity of elections.96 This
legislation addresses the timing of voter registration, 7 absentee
voting rules,9" and prohibitions on discriminatory practices.99 To-
gether, these federal statutes direct the administration of elec-
tions to some degree. However, these laws do not provide any
concrete mechanisms for states to communicate about their elec-
tion administration practices or receive federally supported train-
ing and education for effective administration practices.
The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 ("NVRA") is a fed-
eral statute enacted to regulate the timing of voter registration. '
The NVRA "requires all states to adopt the federal voter registra-
tion procedures detailed in the Act, except for those states that
have no registration requirements or that permit election-day
94. 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2012); MOTEFF, supra note 64, at 2.
95. See generally Cybersecurity: Ensuring the Integrity of the Ballot Box: Hearing Be-
fore the Comm. on House Oversight and Gov't Reform, Subcomm. on Info. Tech., 114th
Cong. (2016) (statement of Lawrence D. Norden, Deputy Director of the Democracy Pro-
gram at the Brennan Center for Justice, NYU School of Law) (acknowledging the largest
threats to the integrity of elections "are attempts to undermine public confidence in the
reliability of that system.")
96. See generally Weinstein-Tull, supra note 13 (providing a comprehensive account of
non-Voting Rights Act federal voting laws).
97. See, e.g., National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77
(codified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501-11 (2012 & Supp. 2015)).
98. See, e.g., Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986, Pub. L.
99-410, 100 Stat. 924 (codified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301-11 (2012 & Supp. 2015)).
99. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
100. Pub. L. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501-11 (2012)).
2017] 1253
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
registration with respect to federal elections."1 °1 In this way, the
federal statute allows for states to escape its reach by permitting
registration until and throughout Election Day. By exempting
states that have no registration requirements and states that al-
low election-day registration from the statute, the NVRA sub-
stantially defers to state discretion. Therefore, though the federal
government has chosen to control voter registration at some level,
it still allows states a large amount of discretion to opt out of fed-
eral requirements.
Congress has also enacted federal statutes imposing require-
ments on the states with respect to absentee voting procedures.
For example, Congress has enacted statutes to protect the absen-
tee voting rights of military personnel stationed overseas. The
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986102
("UOCAVA") "requires states to permit (1) uniformed services
voters and all other voters living overseas, and (2) uniformed ser-
vices voters and their dependents within the U.S., but living out
of their voting jurisdictions, to vote by absentee ballot in federal
elections."'' 3 Interestingly, the UOCAVA places the onus of carry-
ing out the Act on the executive branch by way of the Secretary of
Defense.' Accordingly, the UOCAVA suggests that there is room
for the executive branch of government to play a role in regulat-
ing the administration of elections in the United States.
Federal statutes have also been enacted to quash state voting
administration procedures that had a discriminatory effect on
particular groups of individuals. The Voting Rights Act of 1965,
for example, protects the right to vote for persons of color and in-
dividuals who speak English as a second language."' Section 202
of the Voting Rights Act prohibits all states and localities from
using any test or device to establish voter eligibility."' The expan-
sive nature of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 suggests that the
101. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-470, ELECTIONS: THE SCOPE OF
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 12 (2001) [hereinafter U.S.
GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTIONS: THE SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY].
102. Pub. L. No. 99-410, 101 Stat. 924 (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 203 (2012)).
103. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTIONS: THE SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORITY, supra note 101, at 13.
104. Pub. L. No. 99-410, § 101(a), 100 Stat. 924; Exec. Order No. 12642, 53 Fed. Reg.
21975 (June 10, 1988).
105. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified at 52
U.S.C. §§ 10101-02 (2012)).
106. Id. § 202; see also JOCELYN F. BENSON, STATE SECRETARIES OF STATE 4 (Routledge
ed., 2016).
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federal government is in no way averse to recognizing problems
in state-run election administration procedures and implement-
ing measured responses to rectify the issues states cannot fix
themselves.
In 2002, Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act °7
("HAVA") in response to the "dimple" and "chad" ballot issues of
the 2000 presidential election.' Congress enacted HAVA to recti-
fy election administration issues caused by faulty state proce-
dures. 9 While HAVA provided federal funding to update voting
machines and train state administrators, these improvements
were not made mandatory upon the states."0 HAVA created the
Election Assistance Commission (the "EAC"), which established
voluntary election standards for the states."' The EAC also set
forth voluntary certification standards for voting systems."' Addi-
tionally, the Act could not and did not prohibit states from using
the voting equipment used in the presidential election of 2000.11
As a result, though well intentioned, HAVA essentially "pave[d]
the way for the continued use of the very voting systems associat-
ed with many of the problems plaguing Florida in 2000.""'
DHS's ability to regulate is one of the main reasons it is the
most optimal organizational structure for protecting election sys-
tems as opposed to prior efforts made by Congress through feder-
al legislation. Specifically, because election processes are now
classified as critical infrastructure, DHS's ability to regulate such
processes will be more effective than HAVA. Though Congress
enacted HAVA to bolster the integrity of American elections, "'
HAVA did not grant the EAC any regulatory power."' Section 209
of the Act prohibits the EAC from "issu[ing] any rule, promul-
107. Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901-21145 (2012)).
108. Steven Ramirez & Aliza Organick, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Race and the
Integrity of Democracy in America, 27 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 427, 428, 434-35 (2007); Brandon
Fail, Comment, HAVA's Unintended Consequences: A Lesson for Next Time, 116 Yale L.J.
493, 493 (2006).
109. Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002); Ramirez & Organick, supra note 107,
at 435.
110. Ramirez & Organick, supra note 108, at 435-36.
111. Id. at 436.
112. Id.
113. Help America Vote Act § 102.
114. Ramirez & Organick, supra note 108, at 436.
115. Weinstein-Tull, supra note 13, at 757-59.
116. Leonard M. Shambon, Implementing the Help America Vote Act, 3 ELECTION L.J.
424, 428 (2004).
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gat[ing] any regulation, or tak[ing] any other action.""' 7 This has
caused many scholars to note that HAVA's attempt at centraliz-
ing voting processes and increasing standards for voting infra-
structure is ineffective."' In contrast, DHS's ability to regulate al-
lows it to effectuate its goals in a way HAVA did not authorize
the EAC to do. Classifying election infrastructure as critical in-
frastructure affords DHS regulatory power over the industry.
This regulatory power could help increase communication across
states with respect to election practices, increase federal re-
sources for state administered elections, and promote the popu-
lace's faith in elections by legitimizing voting processes.
III. BENEFITS OF A CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CLASSIFICATION
DHS's current oversight of critical infrastructure sectors focus-
es on information sharing, training and education, partnerships
with local entities and private companies, assessments, analysis,
and regulatory compliance." 9 If this general oversight structure
expands to election processes by way of election infrastructure's
critical infrastructure designation under the United States Code,
states will be better able to communicate about potential threats
from foreign actors to election integrity.2 ' Involving DHS in elec-
tions will also help states gain federal resources to train state
election administrators. Finally, DHS involvement in the election
sphere will promote greater faith in electoral legitimacy. 2 '
117. Pub. L No. 107-252, § 209, 116 Stat. 1678.
118. See, e.g., Herbert E. Cihak, The Help America Vote Act: Unmet Expectations?, 29
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 679, 684 (2007) ("It is not apparent that the EAC ... fully
understood the nation-wide ramifications of replacing punch card voting machines, lever
voting machines, and paper ballots with electronic touch screen voting equipment. As ear-
ly as 1969, studies... indicated that computerized voting presented a whole host of secu-
rity issues."); Fail, supra note 108, at 494 (noting "HAVA might also ensure that future
upgrades [to voting machinery] occur only infrequently and at great cost to state and local
election agencies').
119. OFFICE OF INFRA. PROT., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., IP FACT SHEET, https://www.
dhs.gov/sites/default/files/pubhcations/ip-fact-sheet-508.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
120. See Letter from Tom Carper, U.S. Senator, to Jeh Johnson, Sec'y, Dep't of Home-
land Sec., (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/minority-media/carper-urg
es-dhs-to-protect-the-us-election-systems-from-cyberattacks (discussing how classifying
election systems as critical infrastructure would help to prevent and respond to potential
cyberattacks from inside and outside of the country).
121. See, e.g., Katie Bo Williams, DHS Designates Election System 'Critical Infrastruc-
ture', THE HILL (Jan. 6, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/313132-dhs-desig
nates-election-systems-as-critical-infrastructure (quoting Representative Bennie Thomp-
son, stating that the designation "will put our electoral systems on a more secure footing
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Simply by focusing on the goals of sharing information, increas-
ing federal resources, and ensuring popular faith in election legit-
imacy, states can still be given wide latitude to determine the
time, place, and manner of elections. A critical infrastructure des-
ignation by DHS allows the federal government to tailor its over-
sight policies to the specific industry--election infrastructure. As
a result, the executive branch could certainly adopt a hands-off
approach to regulating voting processes while simultaneously
helping to promote election security on Election Day. Alternative-
ly, DHS could step in and regulate election processes if and when
the agency foresees vulnerability. DHS would be able to play a vi-
tal role in information sharing, provide training for election offic-
ers, and increase faith in American election administration pro-
cedures by conducting assessments of election infrastructure.
DHS already brings these benefits to other critical infrastruc-
ture industries through its regulatory capabilities. DHS regula-
tions on these industries have helped foster information sharing
among critical infrastructure owners, increase federal resources
given to these industries to thwart potential vulnerabilities, and
bolster public faith in the security of these industries.2 ' The posi-
tive benefits enjoyed by the critical infrastructure sectors through
DHS regulation can be duplicated in the election sphere now that
election infrastructure has been designated as critical infrastruc-
ture under the United States Code.
A. Election Infrastructure Can Benefit from DHS Regulations
Intended to Increase Information Sharing Within the Industry
Similar to Those Already Enacted in the Transportation
Systems Critical Infrastructure Sector
In 2005, DHS promulgated a regulation requiring commercial
vessels and aircrafts to share passenger manifest information be-
fore arrival in and departure from the United States.122 The goal
of this regulation, called the "Electronic Transmission of Passen-
ger and Crew Manifests for Vessels and Aircraft," was to alleviate
"the increased terrorist threat facing the United States and in-
and maintain public confidence in our elections").
122. See generally Critical Infrastructure Resources, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., https:
//www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-resources (last visited Apr. 5, 2017) (listing resources
available to critical infrastructure industries).
123. 19 C.F.R. §§ 4.7b, 4.64, 1.2249a, 1.2275a (2005).
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ternational trade and transportation industries, particularly the
commercial air and vessel carrier industries, since the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks., 124 The regulation increased infor-
mation sharing by requiring aircrafts and commercial vessels to
communicate about passenger manifest information before a
threat to the aviation industry could be effectively carried out.
Election infrastructure could benefit from a regulation similar
in spirit to DHS's Electronic Transmission of Passenger and Crew
Manifests for Vessels and Aircraft regulation. Increased commu-
nication across states regarding election administration proce-
dures could help states identify common vulnerabilities. Then,
these states could work together to fix the vulnerabilities in their
processes. The 2016 hack of Illinois and Arizona's voter registra-
tion databases is an apt example of how a lack of information
sharing can affect more than one infrastructure owner.'25 DHS es-
timates that since the hacks into Illinois and Arizona's voter reg-
istration databases, at least eighteen other states' voter registra-
tion systems have also been targeted.2 6 After becoming aware of
this threat to election system security, DHS "stepped up its out-
reach to states and localities ... [by] encouraging them to imple-
ment existing technical recommendations to secure their election
systems and ensure that electronic voting machines are not con-
nected to the internet."'27 However, the way the current system is
structured, the onus is on the states to reach out to DHS for help
in implementing these recommendations."' Despite this burden
on the states to affirmatively reach out to federal agencies for
help in securing their elections, states have noted the vulnerabili-
ties in their own systems and asked DHS to step in to some de-
gree.'29 At least nineteen of the twenty targeted states "expressed
interest in a general 'cyber hygiene' scan of key [voter registra-
tion] websites" from DHS." °
Still, even if DHS could have helped states secure their regis-
tration websites for the 2016 election, any lasting protection of
124. Id.
125. Bruer & Perez, supra note 2.
126. U.S. Official: Hackers Targeted Voter Registration Systems of 20 States, CHI. TRIB.
(Sept. 30, 2016, 4:42 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-hackers-
target-election-systems-20160930-story.html.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. Id.
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voter registration sites by DHS would be impossible without a
critical infrastructure designation or specific congressional legis-
lation addressing the matter directly. Because election infrastruc-
ture has been classified as critical infrastructure, DHS can now
provide information to all states about the nature of the hacks in-
to Arizona's and Illinois' voter registration databases. States can
learn from the vulnerabilities in Arizona's and Illinois' voter reg-
istration websites to better ensure that their own websites do not
suffer from the same weaknesses.
B. Voting Processes Could Benefit from DHS Regulations
Intended to Increase Federal Funding to the Industry Similar
to Those Already Enacted in the Emergency Services Critical
Infrastructure Sector
In 2006, DHS promulgated a regulation that expanded upon an
already established federal loan program.'31 The loan program
provided funding to state and local governments that suffered
losses in revenue after large natural disasters.132 This loan pro-
gram, called the Special Community Disaster Loans Program,
was created in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which
devastated Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, and Louisiana.133 Spe-
cifically, the 2006 regulation proposed "procedures and require-
ments for governments who received Special Community Disaster
Loans to apply for cancellation of loan obligations as authorized
by the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery,
and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007."1" Removing
the burden on state and local governments to repay the disaster
loans allowed them to utilize the full potential of the federal fund-
ing they received.
The Special Community Disaster Loans Program represents
DHS's willingness to offer resources to critical infrastructure sec-
tors in need. A critical infrastructure designation creates an ave-
nue for increased federal funding to reach a particular industry
131. 44 C.F.R. § 206.377 (2006); DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NOTICE OF PROPOSED
RULEMAKING: SPECIAL COMMUNITY DISASTER LOANS PROGRAM 1, 6, https://www.dhs.gov/x
library/assets/nprmfemascdlp_2009-03-30.pdf.
132. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING: SPECIAL
COMMUNITY DISASTER LOANS PROGRAM 1, 3, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nprm-fe
ma.scd1p_2009-03-30.pdf.
133. Id. at 3-4.
134. Id. at 1.
20171 1259
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
sector.13 ' For fiscal year 2016, the Obama administration request-
ed $1.3 billion from Congress for critical infrastructure protec-
tion.'36 This amount was calculated to encompass all of DHS's in-
frastructure protection and information security concerns for the
fiscal year.'37 DHS now has the ability to contribute part of the
billion dollar appropriation it receives from Congress to state
election infrastructure. The additional monetary resources could
lead to advancements that would help thwart potential hacks by
foreign actors on election systems. The funding may go toward
shoring up registration websites, purchasing more secure election
machinery, or training election administration officials to respond
appropriately in the case of a hack on voting systems.
C. Voting Infrastructure Could Benefit from DHS Regulations
Intended to Increase Public Perception of the Industry's
Integrity Similar to Those Already Promulgated in the
Chemical Critical Infrastructure Sector
In 2007, DHS promulgated regulations to "to enhance the secu-
rity of our Nation by ... lowering the risk posed by certain chem-
ical facilities."'38 These Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Stand-
ards ("CFATS") marked the beginning of a comprehensive
regulatory program that placed policies, standards, and certifica-
tion requirements onto many of the country's largest chemical
producers and refiners.'39 Prior to the enactment of these DHS
regulations, chemical safety had become an issue of widespread
concern for the United States population.' As a result, legisla-
tors made concerted attempts to lower the risk of chemical acci-
dents in the country."' A highly publicized gas leak at an Ameri-
can pesticide facility in Bhopal, India, in 1984, prompted
Congress to enact an amendment to the Clean Air Act in 1990,
135. See MOTEFF, supra note 64, at 27.
136. Id. at 32.
137. See id.
138. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 6 C.F.R. § 27.100 (2010).
139. Scott Goodman, Recent Development: Department of Homeland Security's Chemi-
cal Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards and the Program's Immediate Effect on American
Industry, 6 ENvTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 104, 104 (2011).
140. See, e.g., JESSICA ZUCKERMAN, HERITAGE FOUND., CHEMICAL SECURITY IN THE
U.S.: CFATS REGULATION TOO COMPLEX, OVERLY BURDENSOME 2 (Aug. 14, 2012), http:/!
thfmedia.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdfbg2718.pdf.
141. Id.
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commonly known as the Bhopal Amendment. 14 2 This amendment
responded to prevalent public concern over the security of chemi-
cal plants after the Bhopal disaster.'43 The legislation placed addi-
tional obligations and requirements on chemical facility critical
infrastructure owners to handle chemicals carefully in order to
prevent disasters.'
In addition to recognizing the risk for potential chemical acci-
dents, the United States simultaneously recognized the risks of
insecure chemical facilities with respect to potential terrorist ac-
tivities or infiltration by foreign actors. A Congressional Research
Service report on chemical facility security in 2006 noted that
prior to the enactment of the CFATS regulations, evidence exist-
ed to suggest that terrorists could gain access to chemical weap-
ons inside the United States by orchestrating an attack on the
chemical facilities critical infrastructure.4 ' DHS's CFATS regula-
tions represented an effort to quell the public's concern about
chemical industry critical infrastructure vulnerabilities to poten-
tial terrorist threats.
Similar to the public's concern in the early 2000s about poten-
tial foreign attacks on chemical critical infrastructure, the 2016
presidential election has highlighted a general American fear
that state-sponsored actors could attempt to influence the out-
come of election results. 6 This fear threatens the legitimacy of
American elections and the continuity of government. 14 7 Some
commentators have pointed out that a hack on an American elec-
142. Id.
143. See Nehal A. Patel & Ksenia Petlakh, Gandi's Nightmare: Bhopal and the Need
for a Mindful Jurisprudence, 30 HARv. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 151, 153-54 (2014) (de-
scribing the December 3, 1984, Bhopal Disaster in India, when an American-owned pesti-
cide plant caused tens of thousands of deaths by leaking methyl isocyanate into the at-
mosphere).
144. Philip Radford, Protecting Our Communities From a Chemical Disaster,
HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (July 1, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/philip-radford/
protecting-our-communitieb1465680.html.
145. LINDA-JO SCHIEROW, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31530, CHEMICAL FACILITY
SECURITY CRS-4 (2006).
146. NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, OFFICE OF THE DiR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE,
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT: ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS
IN RECENT US ELECTIONS 1 (2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_l01.pdf;
Cory Bennett & Eric Geller, FBIAlert Sparks Fears That State Voting Systems Are Under
Digital Assault, POLITICO (Aug. 29, 2016, 7:25 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/
fbi-states-voting-systems-digital-assualt-227523.
147. NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, OFFICE OF THE DiR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE,
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT: ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS
IN RECENT US ELECTIONS 2 (2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017-Ol.pdf.
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tion could be appealing to state-sponsored actors "because they
can succeed, especially if they find willing accomplices in the tar-
geted country."'48 Citing a long history of state-sponsored at-
tempts to influence elections all over the world, certain scholars
believe that Americans should have expected a certain level of in-
terference in election administration from foreign actors on Elec-
tion Day.'49
Regulation in the election sphere similar to DHS's CFATS reg-
ulations could help Americans regain faith in election legitimacy.
CFATS proposed standards for chemical facilities in order to
shore up the sector's critical infrastructure and secure it from the
risk of foreign attack."0 CFATS also represented DHS's willing-
ness to insert itself into a potentially vulnerable critical infra-
structure sector. Now that DHS has the ability to regulate in the
election space by virtue of a critical infrastructure designation for
election infrastructure, public perception of the legitimacy of elec-
tion outcomes will likely increase."' Just as CFATS quelled the
public's concern over weaknesses in the chemical industry's criti-
cal infrastructure security, DHS regulation of election infrastruc-
ture could quell the current public concern over weaknesses in
state-run election administration security.
CONCLUSION
As technology advances, new opportunities for hackers to infil-
trate critical systems will only continue to grow. State-sponsored
hackers have already shown that they are capable of infiltrating
the United States' political systems by hacking into voter regis-
tration databases and accessing the confidential information of at
least one major political party."2 Election systems may prove es-
pecially vulnerable to state-sponsored threats from hackers in the
future due to the generally insecure nature of current election
148. Paul Musgrave, Why Would Russia Interfere In the U.S. Election? Because It
Sometimes Works, WASH. POST (July 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.composteve
rything/wp/2016/07/26/why-would-russia-interfere-in-the-u-s-election-because-it-usually-
works/.
149. Id. (discussing examples including KGB conspiracy theories regarding Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr.'s death).
150. See SCHIEROW, supra note 145, at CRS 27-32.
151. See supra Part II.B.
152. See Bruer & Perez, supra note 2; Tal Kopan, DNC Hack: What You Need To Know,
CNN (June 21, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/21/politics/dnc-hack-russians-guccifer-
claims/.
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machinery and registration procedures, the lack of federal over-
sight in the election sphere, and the intrinsic connection between
democratic legitimacy and successfully administered elections.
Elections are largely state-administered events. However, the
federal government has the constitutional power to supervise the
state-level administration.1" HAVA represented a federal attempt
to do so, but this federal legislation lacked any practical ability to
impose requirements on state election procedures. HAVA, there-
fore, became more of a suggestion to states regarding election
practices rather than an enforceable law. As a result, states were
able to opt out of the beneficial effects HAVA could have had on
election practices.
The classification of election infrastructure as critical infra-
structure under the United States Code is one possible way to
better protect our elections from state sponsored threats. Classi-
fying voting procedures as critical infrastructure puts elections
within DHS's regulatory reach. As a result, DHS can exercise its
regulatory power to increase information sharing among the
states with respect to election processes, increase federal re-
sources for state election administration, and increase faith in the
democratic process of voting by playing an active role in the elec-
tion space. DHS has already successfully achieved these goals via
regulation in other critical infrastructure sectors. If DHS can du-
plicate the success it had in encouraging information sharing, in-
creasing federal resources, and restoring public faith in the secu-
rity of other critical infrastructures in election systems, it will go
a long way to help prevent a future state-sponsored threat to
United States election systems.
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